"Repressive Measures": A.J. Andrews, the Committee of 1000 and the Campaign Against Radicalism after the Winnipeg General Strike by Mitchell, Tom
"Repressive Measures"
A.I. Andrews, the Committee of 1000 and the Cam-
paign Against Radicalism After the Winnipeg General
Strike
Tom Mitchell
He who establishes a dictatorship and does not kill Brutus,
or he who founds a republic and does not kill the sons of
Brutusf will only reign a short time. (Machiavelli: Dis-
corsi)
In the late spring of 1919, 35 000 unionized and non-unionized
workers in the city of Winnipeg walked off the job in support of
demands by workers in the city's building and metal trades for
collective bargaining rights. From 14 May to 25 June 1919 the
commercial and industrial life ofthe city was effectively shut down.
At the same time, sympathetic strikes spread to communities small
and large across the country. These events were rooted in the
As quoted in Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (London 1940), 9. The
reference to "repressive measures" in the title is taken from AJ. Andrews to
Arthur Meighen, 18 Jul. 1919, National Archives ofCanada (NAC), Records
of the Department of Justice, RG 13, Access 1987-88/103, Box 36, file
A-1688, "Winnipeg General Strike" (Pocket 2) (Hereafter NAC, Access,
"Winnipeg" Justice).
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opposition ofthe country's workers to a return to pre-war relations
of power and authority in a reconstructed Canada.2 Defenders of
the old order seized on the labour revolt of 1919 as a pernicious
challenge to the existing order. The Winnipeg business elite, or-
ganized as the Committee of 1000, sought to mobilize elements of
civil society and the state against the strike. The strike's opponents
in Winnipeg and elsewhere were convinced that the general strike
weapon, successfully deployed, would undermine the property
rights of capital and enfeeble the authority of the state. The strike
could not be allowed to succeed.
Ironically, Canadian historians have been generally reluctant to
explore the complex ontology ofthe 1919 labour revolt.3 As James
Naylor has explained, most accounts "fit [the Winnipeg strike] into
a whiggish narrative of the expansion of a modem industrial
relations regime with free collective bargaining.,,4 Indeed, one
writer has argued that' 'to seek hidden inner meanings to this event,
rather than to study it for what it was, is to impart to it more than
anyone has the right to. ,,5 Yet thoughtful contemporary observers
were not reluctant to describe the pathology afflicting Canadian
society. Nor did they lack for meanings to ascribe to the post-war
maelstrom.6 For their part, the Winnipeg strike's opponents were
2 Gregory Kealey, "1919: The Canadian Labour Revolt," Labour/Le Travail,
13 (1984), 11-44.
3 The standard accounts ofthe strike are D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General
Strike (Toronto 1973); Kenneth McNaught and David 1. Bercuson, The
Winnipeg General Strike: 1919 (Don Mills 1974); David Jay Bercuson,
Confrontation in Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial Relations, and the General
Strike (Montreal 1974); and J.M. Bumsted, The Winnipeg General Strike of
1919: An Illustrated History (Winnipeg 1994).
4 James Naylor, "'Strike or Revolution?' The Labour Revolt of 1919 and the
Winnipeg General Strike," Paper presented to the 29th Annual Northern
Great Plains History Conference, St. Paul, 29 Sept. 1994, 1.
S David Jay Bercuson, Confrontation in Winnipeg (Kingston 1990), 270.
6 See O.D. Skelton who believed that the war had "produced a reckless and
desperate temper" and that "acquiescence in the established order" was a
thing of the past.(O.D. Skelton, "Current Events," Queen's Quarterly,
Jut. - Sept. 1919). W.L. Grant concluded that since 1914 the old order had
been discredited and that post-war society had to be rooted in "something
deeper and more spiritual" than laissez-faire individualisnl.(W.L. Grant,
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convinced that the strike and the agitation that followed it were
products ofa conspiracy designed to transform pervasive post-war
disaffection with the social order into revolution. In August 1919,
Sir James Aikens K.C., Lieutenant Governor ofManitoba, told the
Canadian Bar Association meeting in Winnipeg that the post-war
crisis represented the return ofan age old disorder: "Bolshevism ...
was a recrudescence of an old disease, a frequent consequence of
war."?
Aikens perspective reflected the settled view of the Winnipeg
business and legal communities on post-war radicalism. Organized
under the banner ofthe Citizens' Committee of 1000 from 19 May
1919, Winnipeg's business elite was the principal bulwark against
the strike. Drawn principally from the Board of Trade and the
Winnipeg branch ofthe Manufacturer's Association, the Commit-
tee also included several prominent members ofthe Winnipeg legal
community including A.J. Andrews, Isaac Pitblado, Travers
Sweatman, and J.C. Coyne.8 Andrews, a founding member, was the
principal architect of the suppression of the strike following his
"The Education of the Working Man," Queen's Quarterly, Oct. - Dec.,
1919); a.s. Brett sought the meaning of 1919 in a consideration of man's
tendency to irrationalism. See a.s. Brett, "The Revolt Against Reason: A
Contribution to the History ofThought," in Transactions ofthe RoyalSociety
of Canada, series 3, Vo!. 13, 1919; Robert Falconer was convinced that
Canadian society was in a "diseased condition." See Rohert Falconer's
conference address in the Report of the Proceedings of the National
Conference on Character Education in Relation to Canadian Citizenship
(Winnipeg 1919),25-26. For an international perspective see The Right Hon.
Arthur Henderson, "The Industrial Unrest: A New Policy Required," The
Contemporary Review, Vo!. CXV (Jan.-Jun. 1919). See also Barry Ferguson,
Remaking Liberalism (Montreal & Kingston 1993), 217-8 and Douglas
Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State,
J900 - J945 (Toronto 1986), 80.
7 Proceedings ofthe Fourth Annual Meeting ofthe Canadian Bar Association
(Winnipeg 1920), 85.
8 In the early twentieth century the legal profession in Western Canada had
come to embrace a professionalism preoccupied with containment of
discontent and maintenance of order. See W. Wesley Pue, "A Profession In
Defence ofCapital?" Canadian Journal ofLaw and Society, 7,2 (Fall 1992),
267-84.
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appointment by Arthur Meighen to advise Ottawa on how to defeat
the strike.9 Like Aikins, Andrews and his associates in the Commit-
tee of 1000 did not believe that the defeat of the strike ended the
threat to authority. The Citizens were convinced that labour radical-
ism was at the root of a persistent and deepening crisis that was a
threat, more profound than the strike, to the stability of the social
order. IQ
Insistent on portraying the Winnipeg strike as a straight forward
industrial relations conflict, historians have complacently dis-
missed or ignored developments following in its wake. This ten-
dency is consistent with the construction of the strike as a limited
war of position on the terrain of industrial relations. Yet such an
approach ignores the rich complexity ofthe strike and its aftermath
as principal features ofthe moral and political malaise that afflicted
post-war Canada and threatened the hegemony of the Canadian
business class.
This paper examines the successful campaign of Andrews and
the Citizens' Committee to enlist the authority and resources ofthe
federal Department of Justice in legal and ideological assaults on
labour radicalism after the strike. While these assaults represent the
denouement of the May-June struggle in Winnipeg, they had a
national focus and were designed to discredit and disperse propo-
nents of labour radicalism in Winnipeg and elsewhere and to
restore the legitimacy of the existing order. Ironically, Arthur
9 A member of the Winnipeg elite throughout his career, Andrews was
"respected and feared but never hated by his opponents." Roy St. Stubbs,
Prairie Portraits (Toronto 1954), 54. For a description of the role of AJ.
Andrews in the suppression of the strike see Tom Mitchell, '''To Reach the
Leaders ofthis Revolutionary Movement': AJ. Andrews, the Canadian State,
and the Suppression of the Winnipeg General Strike," Prairie Forum, 18,3
(Fall 1993), 239-255.
10 On the origin and membership of the Citizens' Committee of 1000 see D.C.
Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, 63-8. British Intelligence took an
interest in the counter-revolutionary potential ofthe Committee of 1000. See
Gregory S. Kealey, "The RCMP, the Special Branch, and the Early Days of
the Communist Party in Canada: A Documentary Article," Labour/Le
Travail, 30 (Fall 1992), 170.
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Meighen, who served as acting Minister ofJustice until the Minis-
ter, C.J. Doherty,' returned in late July 1919, repeatedly rejected
demands from Andrews and other leading members ofthe Commit-
tee for Department ofJustice sponsorship ofthis campaign. I I Upon
his return, Doherty abandoned Meighen's position and wedded the
Department ofJustice to the Citizen's project ofrepression.
An examination of these developments, culminating in the
sedition proceedings in Winnipeg in the fall and winter of 1919 and
1920, discloses the nature of the continuing struggle between
capital and labour on the terrain ofpolitics and the law in the wake
ofthe strike. In this struggle, the Winnipeg business and legal elites,
not the workers, were the real historical protagonists. They set the
agenda ofconflict, determined the terrain and rules ofengagement,
and massed the resources ofthe state in a relentless war ofposition
against labour radicalism. Yet, contrary to the general portrayal of
th~ strike's aftermath as a period of abject defeat for labour, the
response ofworkers to the Citizens' campaign was one ofstruggle
and resistance.
From the outset of the strike, the Citizen's Committee had
noisily called for the arrest ofthe strike leadership. On the night of
17 June 1919, this was accomplished when the strike leadership
was taken into custody and held, on Andrews' initiative, under
provisions of both the Criminal Code and the only recently
amended Immigration Act. In the days that followed, Andrews
began the laborious process of examining the mass of material
collected by Royal North West Mounted Police (RNWMP) in raids
in Winnipeg on 17 June 1919 and in others across the country in late
June, and to engage counsel, including Committee of 1000 execu-
tive committee members Isaac Pitblado, Travers Sweatman, and
J.C. Coyne. I2
liOn Meighen's career see Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen: The Door of
Opportunity (Toronto 1960).
12 AJ. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, 2 Jut. 1919, NAC, Access, "Witmipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2). See as well, Andrews to Meighen, 18 June 1919, NAC,
Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 2). D.C. Masters reports that all were
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In early July, Andrews told Meighen that Hugh Phillips, K.C., who
had been retained by the province to deal with cases arising from
the General Strike, had asked that federal authorities undertake the
prosecution of J.S. Woodsworth and Fred Dixon, arrested on 25
June 1919 for their efforts in publishing the Western Labour
News. I3 Andrews supported the request. He believed that the
country could not "afford on the score of economy to neglect any
legitimate means of bringing to light the true situation as it exists
in Canada.,,14 Meighen disagreed. He told Andrews that, as
Woodsworth and Dixon had been arrested on instructions of pro-
vincial authorities, and as the duty for such prosecutions was a
provincial one, he could see no reason why the federal government
should take the cases. I5
Clearly taken by surprise, Andrews implored Meighen to direct
him to proceed with the cases for "prosecution should follow to
justify these raids." 16 He reiterated his position on 10 July 1919
asserting that evidence existed to prove that there was an active,
persistent and effective campaign being carried on in favour of
Bolshevism. Prosecutions and vigorous action on the part of gov-
ernment would cause "fear and confusion in the ranks of the
"extremely active" in the Committee of 1000. D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg
General Strike, 64.
13 AJ. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, 3 Jul. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2). For Phillips recollection of his role in the Strike see
Winnipeg Tribune, 6 April 1949. Andrews included lA. Martin, and James
Grant with Woodsworth and Dixon. Martin and Grant never faced trial as the
Grand Jury ofthe Eastern Judicial District declined to return true bills against
them for allegedly having spoken seditious words. Winnipeg Evening
Tribune, 25 Nov. 1919. In January and February 1920 Fred Dixon, after
defending himself, was acquitted ofcharges ofseditious libel. In light ofthe .
decision in the Dixon case, the Crown chose to drop its case against
Woodsworth. See D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, 124-6.
14 AJ. Andrews to Meighen, 2 Ju1. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice,
(Pocket 2).
15 Arthur Meighen to AJ. Andrews,4 Jul 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2). Meighen had expressed similar views in the Commons.
See Debates ofthe House ofCommons, Vol. IV, 1919,3845-6.
16 AJ. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, 7 Ju1. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2).
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revolutionists. " Yet, Andrews explained, the Government ap-
peare~ to believe that "repression and suppression tend[ed] to
flame rather than destroy revolutionary tendencies." Andrews and
what he termed his "associate council" were unanimous in the
view that "the only way to deal with Bolshevism is to hit it and to
hit it hard, every time it lifts its ugly head. ,,17 He concluded by
threatening that ifthe prosecution ofthe arrested strike leaders and
others was dropped not only would there be a gross failure in the
administration ofthe law, "but ... your government will be blamed
as much as the local government. ,,18
The Manitoba government had no appetite for criminal prosecu-
tions ofthe strike leaders. The Norris government was eager to see
an end to social strife. Elected by a rural populace almost certain to
be unenthusiastic about an expensive prosecution at a time ofrural
economic distress, it was largely immune to pressure from the
Citizens' Committee to proceed with prosecutions arising from the
strike. 19 Manitoba's disinterest, combined with Meighen's rejec-
tion ofAndrews' demand for federal sponsorship, made any prose-
cution increasingly problematic. On 3 July 1919, when the strike
leaders appeared in court, ostensibly for a preliminary hearing on
the charges against them, their cases were remanded at Andrews'
request.20
At the same time, agitation continued against any criminal
prosecution or summary deportation of the Winnipeg strike lead-
ers. Across the country individuals, labour councils, women's
17 AJ. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, 10 Jut. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2).
18 Ibid.
19 On the Norris government's role in the Strike see W.L. Morton, Manitoba:
A History (Toronto 1957), 368-73.
20 Those remanded included R.B.Russell, William Ivens, W.A. Pritchard, John
Queen, A.A. Heaps, George Armstrong, R.E. Bray, RJ. JoOOs, Sam
Blumenberg, Oscar Schoppelrei, Moses Almazoff, Max Charitonoff, and
Mike Verenczuk. The latter five were transferred from Stoney Mountain
Penitentiary to the Winnipeg Immigration Hall pending their hearing under
the Immigration Act. The others were freed on bail. Winnipeg Free Press, 4
Jul. 1919, 5.
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labour leagues, and informally organized groups of workers peti-
tioned the Department of Justice for "British justice" for the
arrested men?1 As well "defence committees" were organized to
raise funds in support ofthe strike leaders and to campaign for their
release. In a speech to an open air rally in Winitipeg's Market
Square on 9 July 1919, F.J. Dixon asserted that "the Canadian
people were in the process ofhaving their rights and liberties stolen
from them by the shabbiest pack of political jackals that ever
harassed a civilized country.' ,22
On 11 July 1919, consideration of the criminal charges was
postponed again at Andrews' request. He told the court that he had
not had adequate time to examine the mass of evidence gathered
against the accused?3 In fact, Andrews' incapacity was rooted in
the refusal ofthe federal Department ofJustice to sponsor prosecu-
tions from which the Province of Manitoba had for all practical
purposes withdrawn. On 12 July Andrews told Meighen that pro-
vincial authorities had finally decided not to proceed with prosecu-
tion of any of the sedition cases.24 He pressed for permission to
intervene. He was told "not to do so. ,,25 Yet, Andrews would not
relent. He told Meighen that reports from the Secret Service indi-
cated an increasingly active propaganda in favour of "revolution."
Moreover, all who were engaged in preparing for the prosecution
believed that "repressive measures confuse and defeat the ends of
21 For a discussion of the use by workers of public protest, petitions, letters to
protest the detention and trial of the strike leaders see James Muir, "The
Demand For British Justice: Protest and Culture During the Winnipeg
General Strike Trials," unpublished paper, University ofManitoba Canadian
Legal History Project. For a list of the letters and petitions both supporting
and opposing the detention and trial ofthe strike leaders see Ken Kehler and
Alvin Esau, Famous Manitoba Trials: The Winnipeg General Strike Trials-
Research Source (Winnipeg 1990), 73-85. These actual petitions and letters
are contained in NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1).
22 Winnipeg Free Press, 10 Ju!. 1919, 5.
23 Ibid., 12 Ju!. 1919.
24 AJ. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, 12 Jul 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2).
25 Arthur Meighen to AJ. Andrews, 14 Jul. 1919 and 17 Jut. 1919, NAC,
Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 2).
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agitators, " while inaction by the state contributed to the effective-
ness ofradical propaganda.26 IfMeighen refused to act, he expected
that the " the Citizens' Committee would instruct private counsel
to carry on the prosecution ofthese cases.,,27
Some writers have argued that, following the Winnipeg strike,
A.l. Andrews "was a restraining influence ... upon extremists, like
Meighen, in the cabinet.' ,28 Such a reading ofMeighen' s role in the
developments following the arrest of the strike leaders and the
suppression ofthe strike is fundamentally wrong. In fact, Andrews
and his associates in the Committee of 1000 were the "extremists"
determined to mobilize the federal state in an active offensive
against labour radicalism. It was Meighen who rejected their claims
at every turn and dismissed their grim warnings of impending
social disorder.29 He was resolute that the special circumstances
that had warranted an extraordinary intervention ofthe federal state
in the lives of Canadians had ended with the conclusion of the
war.3D On 26 June 1919 Robert Borden had explained to a caucus
26 AJ. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, 18 July 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2).
27 AJ. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, 18 Jul. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2). The convention that the state would act as the principal
prosecutor ofthe criminal law is a relatively recent convention. Douglas Hay
makes the point that "private prosecution was carefully protected until the
recent past, and that it was thought an important constitutional guarantee of
civil liberty." He quotes Sir James Stephen, writing in 1883, that private
prosecutions "both in our days and earlier times, have given a legal vent to
feelings every way entitled to respect, and have decided peaceably and in an
authentic manner many questions of great constitutional importance." For
both quotes see Douglas Hay, "Controlling the English Prosecutor,"
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 21,2 (June 1983), 166-7.
28 McNaught and Bercuson, The Winnipeg General Strike: 1919, 81.
29 In a wire to Andrews dated 17 Jut. 1919 Meighen told Andrews that "Council
takes ground that Federal Govenunent cannot undertake prosecutions have
everywhere until now been entered and conducted by Provincial authority."
NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 2).
30 See Gregory S. Kealey, "State Repression ofLabour and the Left in Canada,
1914-1920: The Impact of the First World War," Canadian Historical
Review, 73 (Sept. 1992),281-314, for an examination of the activities of the
Canadian state in suppressing radicalism and defending Canadian capitalism
during and immediately after the Great War.
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meeting of Union supporters that to secure a mandate from the
country three policies, among others, were essential to success:
upholding constitutional authority at the federal, provincial and
municipal level; abandoning repressive and restrictive measures
necessitated by the war; and recognizing the "legitimate and rea-
sonable" aspirations oforganized labour.3l Meighen's rejection of
Andrews' call to arms was consistent with Borden's design for a
return to normalcy.
For similar reasons, Meighen was also unwilling to bend to the
Committee of 1000's determination to employ Orders in Council
approved under the War Measures Act to prosecute those found in
possession ofprohibited literature. On 17 July 1919 Andrews had
wired Meighen to urge prosecution of persons found with prohib-
ited matter. Andrews sought authority to proceed under Section 7,
Order 2, of the Consolidated Orders in Council. He told Meighen
that Pitblado, Coyne and others supported the idea and that Com-
missioner Perry of the RNWMP had assumed that prosecutions
under the Consolidated Orders would follow the raids at the end of
June. Andrews explained that the benefits ofthe raids would be lost
if no action was taken against those in possession of prohibited
publications. Moreover prosecutions "would be ample justifica-
tion for the making ofthe raids. ,,32
Andrews had wired for special instructions from Meighen be-
cause, under the Consolidated Censor Orders, if the prosecution
was initiated on instructions from the Minister, the information
itself, explained Andrews, was "prima facie proof of all facts
alleged therein and would save a great deal of expense and diffi-
culty in securing convictions. ,,33 Ernest Chambers, chief press
censor for the Borden government from June 1915 to 1 January
31 Robert Laird Borden, His Memoirs, Vol. II (Toronto 1969), 220. On this
general theme see as well James Naytor, "Workers and the State:
Experiments in Corporatism After World War One," Studies in Political
Economy, 42 (Autumn 1993), 95-6.




1920 who was in Winnipeg at Andrews' insistence, also wired
Ottawa to urge that, "considering the conditions existing here and
the opportunity for making examples" ofthose found in possession
of radical propaganda, that prosecution under the Consolidated
Orders respecting censorship had to be authorized by Ottawa.34
Meighen refused. In a letter to Ed Anderson35 - since 1906 a
member of the Winnipeg law firm of Moran, Anderson and Guy,
and in 1919 a prominent figure in the Committee of 1000 -
Meighen explained that it was not unexpected that the "citizens"
would look to the Government that made the regulations to initiate
and conduct prosecutions for violations of them. However, the
Government had to have
regard to its proper sphere ofduty and especially to the effect as a
precedent and otherwise of our assuming at this stage of censor-
ship work, duties that are constitutionally clearly provincial.36
In short, Meighen understood that the authority to act under the
provisions ofthe War Measures Act did not apply after 11 Novem-
ber 1919. Such an approach was consistent with Meighen's ap-
proach to dealing with the crisis through resort to permanent
legislation including amendments to the Immigration Act and the
Criminal Code.37 As long as Meighen remained acting Minister of
Justice, no prosecutions under the Consolidated Orders were ap-
proved.
34 E. Chambers to C.J. Doherty, 17 Jul. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 1). For a discussion ofChambers career as chiefpress censor
during the Great War and the post-war crisis see JeffKeshen, "All the News
That Was Fit to Print: Ernest J. Chambers and Infonnation Control in Canada,
1914-1919," Canadian Historical Review, 73,3 (1992),313-43.
35 On Anderson see Who's Who in Canada (Toronto 1937), 371. Meighen to
Ed Anderson, K.C., 18 Jut. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket
2).
36 Ibid.
37 F. Murray Greenwood, "The Drafting and Passage ofthe War Measures Act
in 1914 and 1927: Object Lessons in the Need for Vigilance," in W. Wesley
Pue and Barry Wright, Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in
Legal History (Ottawa 1988), 304.
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In addition to his refusal to sponsor prosecution of the strike
leaders or to employ Orders in Council against radicalism,
Meighen frustrated the Committee of 1000's demands for a na-
tional commission of inquiry into labour radicalism. The Commit-
tee had rejected the Robson Commission, appointed by the
Province ofManitoba on 4 July 1919 to inquire into and report upon
causes and effects ofthe General Strike, as too narrow in focus. On
7 July 1919 Edward Anderson wrote to Meighen to explain that he,
Issac Pitblado, J.B Coyne, and Travers Sweatman were convinced
that a national commission was required to investigate the One Big
Union, the Socialist Party ofCanada, the spread ofBolshevism and
its connection with the Winnipeg General Strike. They believed
that the focus ofthe Robson Commission was too narrow for "what
the Dominion government has on hand is a Dominion wide matter
and not local at all.,,~8 A.J. Andrews also wanted a national
commission appointed. He told Meighen that his associates in the
Committee of 1000 were' 'very insistent that this should be done."
Andrews linked the commission of inquiry with pending criminal
prosecutions of the strike leaders. In a letter to Meighen on 8 July
1919, he noted cryptically that, if the commission was appointed,
he could disclose "a source of evidence that would make it com-
paratively easy to proceed with our prosecutions. ,,39
38 Edward Anderson, K.C., to Arthur Meighen, 7 Jul. 1919, NAC, Access,
"Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 2).
39 AJ. Andrews to Arthur Meighen, 8 Jul. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2). Andrews also lobbied Sen. Gideon Robertson, the
Minister of Labour, on the matter of a commission and sought Robertson's
support for the Committee's efforts in the battle against radicalism. He
proposed that the Committee be given a "money grant" and, to counter the
propaganda of the radicals, he recommended that the government distribute .
"carefully prepared sound publications and ... supplement this with a
campaign of lectures throughout the country." AJ. Andrews to Sen. G.D.
Robertson, 9 Jul. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 2). The
first suggestion appears to have been followed. In August 1920 the
Department of Labour issued a supplement to the Labour Gazette entitled
Information Respecting the Russian Soviet System and Its Propaganda in
North America. Records of the Department of Labour, RG27, Vol. 168, File
613.04: 1.
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Meighen rejected the idea of such a commission as simply a
duplication ofthe work of the Robson Commission. The Commit-
tee of 1000 refused to accept this view. On 16 July 1919 A.L.
Crossin, a prominent Winnipeg business executive and in 1919 the
investment manager for the firm of Oldfield, Kirby and Gardner,
wrote to Meighen on behalfofthe Citizens.4o Crossin told Meighen
that a commission was required
to inquire into the origin ofthe Bolshevistic campaign in Canada
by whom promoted and financed what its objects are and the
means taken to spread the propaganda and also to investigate any
other revolutionary movement having any connection with this.41
Moreover, he asserted that the Winnipeg General Strike had been
promoted by extremists inspired by the "Bolshevistic movement
in Russia," was "financed by sources not yet made public," and
was part of a "conspiracy, national, or international in character."
Crossin concluded that Canada's labour organizations had been
"hoodwinked" into supporting this revolutionary movement,
which, "if not destroyed, will destroy us." Accordingly, "a com-
plete exposure of the whole damnable conspiracy ... is imperative
if we are to have industrial peace in Canada. No judicial trial or
provincial commission can be expected to disclose the origin,
extent, and purposes of this movement.,,42
In an effort to mollify the Committee, Meighen told Ed Ander-
son that the stream of correspondence from Winnipeg had caused
him great concern, principally because "the majority of Council
could not see their way clear to meet fully, the wishes of the
Committee. ' ,43 Yet he had secured authority from Cabinet to direct
Andrews to make "certain enquiries which iffavourably answered,
40 On Crossin see the Winnipeg Tribune, 22 Oct. 1956.
41 A.L. Crossin to Arthur Meighen, 16 Jul. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2).
42 Ibid.
43 Arthur Meighen to Edward Anderson, 18 Jut. 1919, NAC, Access,
"Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 2).
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will result in action that I think will be satisfactory all around.' ,44
On 18 July Meighen directed Andrews to consult with the provin-
cial Attorney General and ascertain whether the province would
object to the Dominion Government constituting Robson a com-
missioner under the Enquiries Act to engage in a general investiga-
tion of labour radicalism along the lines desired by the Citizens'
Committee. Robson would execute both commissions concurrently
and report to each government. Andrews was also directed to
consult with Robson. There is no evidence that Andrews followed
these directives from Meighen.45
Notwithstanding the Province of Manitoba's refusal to prose-
cute the sedition cases, and Meighen's repeated direction to An-
drews that the federal Department of Justice would assume no
responsibility for these prosecutions, on 22 July 1919 Andrews
appeared in court ostensibly for the crown during a preliminary
hearing into charges against the strike leaders before Provincial
Police Magistrate R.M. Noble.46 As there is no evidence to suggest
that the direction given Andrews by Meighen had been changed, or
that the province had reconsidered, it is unclear for whom Andrews
was appearing. Perhaps the transition required by the return ofC.J.
Doherty from Europe allowed Andrews some discretion and he
chose to proceed notwithstanding Meighen's explicit direction not
to do so. Certainly the issue ofwho was representing the Crown was
unclear to the defendants. In 1926, A.A. Heaps, one of those
arrested in 1919, told the House ofCommons that
It was a mystery during the whole of that period as to who
constituted the Crown. We could not find out. We were told there
44 Ibid.
45 Arthur Meighen to AJ. Andrews, 18 Jul. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 2).
46 Concurrent with his activities as Provincial Police Magistrate, at the behest
ofAJ. Andrews, Noble had been appointed to Chair the Immigration Board
which was responsible for making a decision under the revised Immigration
Act on the deportation of various individuals detained because of their
involvement in the labour crisis of 1919. AJ. Andrews to Arthur Meighen,
11 Jut. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1).
Repressive Measures
were two authorities representing the Crown, one in Manitoba the
other in Ottawa.47
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In any event, a gruelling preliminary hearing extended to 2 August
1919, during which 118 witnesses were called and over 1600
exhibits filed. At the conclusion of the hearing, the strike leaders
were committed to trial at the fall assizes of the Eastern Judicial
District in November.48
By 25 July 1919 C.J. Doherty had returned to his position as
federal Minister of Justice. Appointed at the outset of Borden's
tenure as Prime Minister, he had had a distinguished career in law
and had taught civil and intemationallaw at McGill University. He
was close to the Montreal financial community, director ofa variety
of financial institutions, and President of the Canadian Securities
Corporation.49 In 1918, Doherty had worked closely with C.H.
Cahan, a Montreal lawyer retained by Borden to advise the Union
government on how to deal with the danger of radicalism. When
Cahan produced a report in September 1918 calling for a campaign
ofrepression against radicalism, he and Doherty worked closely to
ensure the implementation of its provisions. These included, in
part, the creation of the Public Safety Branch (PBS), created by
Order in Council in October 1918 with Cahan as Director. The
meteoric rise ofCahan's influence in the Union government ended
in January 1919 when Cahan resigned from his position ofDirector
of Public Safety. Shortly after his resignation, the PBS was abol-
47 Debates ofthe House ofCommons, Vol IV, 1926, col. 4014.
48 AJ. Andrews to Colonel C. Stames, 12 Aug. 1919, NAC, Access,
"Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1). As would be the case in the trial, a central
legal issue in the preliminary hearing was the appropriateness of Crown's
evidence against the accused. The court defended the prosecution's right to
introduce a wide array of evidence against the accused on the basis that the
accused were "ringleaders during the strike." See D.e. Masters, The
Winnipeg General Strike, 116. Masters quotes WJ. Tremeear to the effect
that "Evidence is admissible of what was said or done in furtherance of the
common design by a conspirator not charged, after proofofexistence of the
common design."
49 Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, A Nation Transformed: Canada
1896-1921 (Toronto 1974),191.
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ished. Though Cahan succeeded in alienating Doherty by moving
beyond the authority ofhis position as Director ofPublic Safety, it
is clear that Doherty had been an enthusiatic advocate within the
Union government of Cahan's proposals for the suppression of
radicalism.50
Not surprisingly, in Doherty, Andrews found a Minister of
Justice disposed to accept his counsel on the menace ofradicalism.
Unlike Meighen, Doherty was ready to prosecute using the Con-
solidated Orders in Council approved under the War Measures Act.
He told Andrews that he would prosecute as long as procedures
outlined in the Orders were adhered to.51 In early August, he
approved the prosecution ofJacob Miller and the publisher ofDie
Volkestimme. 52 At the same time, Doherty and Andrews evidently
corresponded on matters related to the Winnipeg strike; and in late
August Andrews was invited to Ottawa to discuss the state ofaffairs
relating to the Winnipeg prosecutions.53 By that time, Doherty had
apparently secured cabinet approval to sponsor the prosecution of
50 On these developments see Gregory S. Kealey, "The Surveillance State: The
Origins of Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in Canada,
1914-1921," Intelligence and National Security, 7, 3 (1992), 184-91.
51 See telegram CJ. Doherty, Minister ofJustice to Colonel EJ. Chambers, 19
Jul. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1). For pennission to
proceed see CJ. Doherty to AJ. Andrews, 26 Jut. 1919, NAC, Access,
"Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 2). It is noteworthy the a number of letters
between Andrews and Doherty written in late July were removed from those
liberated under the Freedom of Infonnation Act. F. Murray Greenwood
argues that "all concerned in 1914 [including Doherty who helped draft the
bill] assumed the Act would terminate at the end of the war and the fact it
could remain on the statute books was a drafting slip due to the urgency with
which it was passed." See F. Murray Greenwood, "The Drafting and Passage
of the War Measures Act in 1914 and 1927: Object Lessons in the Need for
Vigilance,"298.
52 See Andrews to Doherty, 6 Aug. 1919 and C.l Doherty to Andrews, 8 Aug.
1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1).
53 C.J. Doherty to AJ. Andrews, 19 Aug. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 1). Andrews and Doherty had corresponded on these matters
in late July and early Aug. 1919. The correspondence from 28 Jut. 1919 to 6
Aug. 1919 involving five pages of correspondence was removed from the
file released under the Freedom of Infonnation Act. See NAC, Access,
"Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 2), 231.
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strike leaders. Andrews had, for all practical purposes, replaced
Cahan as the Union government's principal mentor on the repres-
sion ofradicalism.
The responses of Arthur Meighen and C.l. Doherty to the
demands of Andrews and the Committee of 1000 provide an
interesting illustration of how the state "may appear to be the
'historical subject,' but is in fact the object ofprocesses and forces
at work in society. ,,54 Clearly, the principal 'subject' shaping
events in the wake ofthe strike was a triumphant regional business
elite intent on reasserting its authority and crushing its adversaries.
The activities ofboth Meighen and Doherty thus illustrate the real,
yet limited, autonomy ofthe Canadian state in the face ofdemands
for action by powerful elements ofcivil society.
Doherty's decision to wed the resources of the federal Depart-
ment ofJustice to the crusade ofthe Committee of 1000 was clearly
a triumph for Andrews and the Committee. Had Doherty not agreed
to this extraordinary intervention, the trial of the strike leaders
scheduled for the fall of 1919 would never have been held. The
trials were the fruit ofAndrews' action in laying charges against the
strike leadership under the Criminal Code in June, his tenacious
lobby for prosecution of the cases, and Doherty's willingness to
engage the resources of the Canadian state in an extraordinary
assault on labour radicalism.
The costs of the prosecution had to be readjusted upwards at
least three times. In the absence of a budget approved through
Parliament, funds had to be provided through an Order in Council
from monies approved by Parliament under the Demobilization
Act.55 This procedure had the advantage of masking the involve-
54 Ralph Miliband, "State Power and Class Interests," New Left Review, 38
(Mar.-Apr. 1983), 59.
55 On 10 Oct. 1919 cabinet approved an Order in Council whereby the sum of
$35,000 was set aside from the Demobilization Appropriation in order to
make payments of the legal expenses incurred in connection with the
Winnipeg General Strike. Further Orders in Council on 6 Nov. 1919, and 31
Jan. 1920, were approved for the amounts of $20,000, $50,000. A total of
$105,000 was approved through Orders in Council for such expenditures by
150 left history
ment of the federal government in an extraordinary legal manoeu-
vre. Still, the federal Auditor General found the procedure objec-
tionable. On 3 February 1920 E.D. Sutherland told the Department
ofJustice that he could not
see that the legal, or in fact any other expenditure connected with
the strike, has any relation to the purposes for which that appro-
priation was provided.
He noted that Section 2(a) of the Demobilization Act had as one
purpose "the defence and security ofCanada." Sutherland did not
believe that the "suppression of strikes was contemplated under
this heading, and certainly not the legal expenses arising out ofsuch
occurrences." The Auditor General suggested that Parliament be
asked for a special vote to approve the expenditures,56 but his
advice was dismissed.57
Access to apparently unlimited financial resources was only one
advantage ofthe Crown in the prosecution ofthe cases. The Crown
had the advantage of a sympathetic judge. On 26 November 1919
Mr. Justice Metcalfe ofthe Manitoba Court ofKing's Bench began
to hear the trial of R.B. Russell and his co-defendants.58 The
the conclusion ofthe Russell trial. Later on 21 Apr. 1920 an Order in Council
was approved setting aside an additional $50,000 for the prosecution of the
sedition cases. NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1).
56 E.D. Sutherland, Auditor General to E.L. Newcombe, Deputy Minister of
Justice, 3 Feb. 1920, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1).
57 Newcombe suggested that the expenditures were warranted as the strike
conditions were "due in their conception or manifestation to war conditions."
See E.L. Newcombe to E.D. Sutherland, Auditor General, 6 Feb. 1920, NAC,
Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1).
58 They included William Ivens, RJ. Johns, George Annstrong, W.A. Pritchard,
AId. 1. Queen, R.E. Bray, and AId. A.A. Heaps.Thejudge in the case, Thomas
Llewellin Metcalfe, was horn in Portage la Prairie in 1870. After completing
his school in Portage he articled with legal firms in Portage la Prairie and
Winnipeg. He was called to the Manitoba Bar in 1894. Metcalfe was a partner
in a number of Winnipeg legal firms. He was appointed a members of the
Dominion Statute Law Commission in 1902, the King's bench in 1909 and
the Manitoba Court of Appeal in 1921. In politics Metcalfe was a Liberal.
Prior to his appointment to the bench, he served the Party as a member of its
provincial executive and as an effective campaigner. His health was
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appearance of the strike leaders before Metcalfe was no accident.
In the summer Andrews had considered seeking a venue for the
trials outside Winnipeg. However the release on bail of the strike
leaders in September by Chief Justice Mathers, who resided in
Portage la Prairie, ended such thinking.59 Andrews told Deputy
Minister of Justice E.L. Newcombe that Mathers' position on
granting bail to the accused suggested that the Crown would have
"difficulty in getting in our evidence with him, much greater in any
event than before either Justice Metcalfe or Justice GaIt who are
taking the Winnipeg assizes." 60
The Crown also had the means to give the jury list special
scrutiny. When the assizes opened on 4 November 1919, Andrews
turned the list over to the RNWMP with ninety-seven copies of a
document he had prepared.61 Each contained a list of twenty-five
questions. Andrews wanted to know the views of potential jurors
with regard to the Union Government war policy, Bolshevism, the
Winnipeg General Strike, the Committee of 1000, trade unions and
socialism. He also wanted to know whether potential jurors were
returned men and, if so, volunteers or conscripts, whether jurors
were Laurier Liberals, Conservatives, Unionist or Socialists, and
destroyed by the Winnipeg General Strike trials; he died in 1922. See
Winnipeg Free Press, 4 Apr. 1922 and Winnipeg Tribune, 5 Apr. 1922 and
the Biographical File, T.L. Metcalfe, Archive of Western Canadian Legal
History, Faculty of Law, University ofManitoba.
59 For a discussion of the events and issues associated with the granting ofbail
to the strike leaders see Leslie Katz, "Some Legal Consequences of the
Winnipeg General Strike," Manitoba Law Journal (1970), 39-52.
60 AJ. Andrews to Honourable E.L. Newcombe, Deputy Minister of Justice,
18 Sept. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1).
61 E.P. Thompson has explained that the "scrutiny of the panel is, [an] ancient
and venerable practice," E.P. Thompson, "Subduing the Jury," London
Review ofBooks, 8, 22, 18 Dec. 1986, 13. Still, if the use of the RNWMP
was a routine procedure in such investigations, it is unlikely that Stames
would have reported it to the Commissioner complete with a copy of the
questionnaire. See Supt. C. Stames to the Commissioner of the RNWMP, 5
Nov. 1919. NAC, Records of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, RG 18,
Vol. 3314, file HV-l, Vo1.6, "Winnipeg General Strike and Riot" (hereafter
NAC Access "Winnipeg" RCMP).
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whether they were affluent.62 Finally, he sought a recommendation
from the RNWMP on the suitability ofeach juror.
The contest associated with the selection of the jury disclosed
the difficulties of mounting a successful defence on contestable
procedural and substantive aspects of the criminal law. In the
process ofjury selection the defence could reject a small number of
jurors through peremptory challenges. For its part, the Crown
possessed a virtually unlimited power to reject jurors through its
ability to "stand by" a juror until all other potential jurors were
considered.63 Andrews almost certainly had knowledge of the
attitudes ofthe potential jurors on a number ofthemes central to the
trial at hand. With this and his access to standby, the struggle over
the selection of the jury was one that Andrews had every opportu-
nity to win. Even so, the Crown's determination to limit the
opportunity of the defence to challenge fundamentally altered the
trial of the strike leaders. During the afternoon of Wednesday,
27 November 1919 the Crown chose to try R.B. Russell separately
and hold over the trial of the others until January 1920.64 The
Crown was concerned that, ifthe defence exercised all the peremp-
tory challenges at its disposal with eight defendants, the available
jury panel might be exhausted before ajury was selected.
Undaunted, the defence sought to extend its number of chal-
lenges by fundamentally altering the charges facing Russell. Fol-
lowing the decision of the bench that the defence had only four
peremptory challenges and that these had been used, defence
sought unsuccessfully to have Russell tried under the amended
62 Supt. C. Stames to the Commissioner of the RNWMP, 5 Nov. 1919. NAC
"Winnipeg General Strike and Riot." A bill from the McDonald Detective
Agency submitted to the Justice Department by AJ. Andrews on 5 Jan. 1920
suggests that Agency was also employed in scrutinizing the jury. See NAC,
Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, (Pocket 1).
63 See E.P. Thompson, "Subduing the Jury," 12.
64 Winnipeg Evening Telegram, 27 Nov. 1919. R.B. Russell was a native of
Scotland where he had received his training as a machinist. After immigrating
to Canada in 1911 he settled in Winnipeg and soon became involved in the
city's labour movement and the Winnipeg local of the Socialist Party of
Canada.
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Criminal Code assented to 7 July 1919 and in effect since 1October
1919. Conviction under the amended Code could mean a sentence
of twenty rather than two years for Russell. Yet the threat of a
longer sentence entitled the defence to greater peremptory chal-
lenges. Following rejection of the request to have Russell tried
under the amended Criminal Code, the only jurors to be rejected
were those "stood aside" by the Crown. In the final analysis,
Andrews got his jury. It was composed entirely offarmers and rural
businessmen.65
Russell and his co-defendents had been arrested and charged for
their roles in the Winnipeg General Strike. Yet, the indictment ran
to twenty-seven pages and covered events dating back to the
meeting in the Majestic Theatre in Winnipeg in the winter of 1918,
through to the end ofthe Winnipeg General Strike in June 1919. In
the indictment, Russell and the others were charged with six counts
of seditious conspiracy and one count of being a public nuisance.
The central thrust ofthe indictment was that the Strike was planned
as "a step in a revolution against the constituted form of govern-
ment in Canada. ,,66 Defence counsels' demand that the indictment
be quashed because it did not specify on what basis or because of
what acts and words Russell and his co-conspirators should be
found guilty ofseditious conspiracy was rejected by Metcalfe.67
The indictment defined the terrain on which the Crown intended
to mount its ideological assault on labour radicalism as sedition.
65 Russell's fate rested with fanners Edward Heney and Theo Nugets from
Sanford , T.W. Smith from Emerson, William Hassett from St. Francois
Xavier, Roy Tolton from Otterburne, Albert A. Anderson from East Selkirk,
Joseph Frechette from St. Pierre, D.H. Pritchard from Cannen, William Heale
from Teulon; and WiIIiam McClymont a merchant from Hazelridge, HarI
Woodhead a merchant from Morris, and C.T. Fisher a manager from
Norwood. Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 24 Dec. 1919.
66 Bill of Indictment, King vs Russell (1919). PAM, GR 950, Attorney
General's Records, Central Registry. See also the indexed copy of the
indictment in the Pitblado Papers, Scrapbook Winnipeg General Strike Trials,
PAM, MG, C 64, Box 4. For a summary of the indictment see D.C. Masters,
The Winnipeg General Strike, 114.
67 Winnipeg Evening Telegram, 19 Nov. 1919.
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Through it, the Committee of 1000's view ofthe 1919 labour revolt
was formally embraced by the state as a basis for the criminal
prosecution and punishment of the strike leadership. The labour
revolt of 1919 was effectively transformed by the Crown into a
criminal venture. Yet, the trials of Russell and the other strike
leaders were not about bringing criminals to justice. They were
ideological events designed to mobilize consent for the established
order while constructing strict limitations on the legality of any
criticism of the state and on demands for fundamental change in
relations ofproduction.68
A central issue in the trial concerned how one defined sedition.
The Criminal Code provided some guidance. Subsection one of
Section 132 of the Code, prior to amendment in 1919, stated that
seditious words were "words expressive of a seditious intent."
Subsection three asserted that a seditious conspiracy was "an
agreement between two or more persons to carry into execution a
seditious intention. ,,69 Section 134 set out that everyone was
"guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years imprison-
ment who speaks seditious words, or publishes any seditious libel,
or is a party to any seditious conspiracy." 70 In efforts to define the
law, Andrews explained that the accused were not on trial for what
they said, or for what they intended, but for what "would ... be the
natural result of such words." The law presumed that Russell
intended the natural consequences of his actions or words. More-
over, it was irrelevant whether his words did create public disorder.
68 The legal adventures associated with the Winnipeg General Strike illustrate
Richard F. Devlin's comment that "Law is incorrigibly subjective. Indeed,
the manipulation oflegality is one ofthe most important techniques employed
by the capitalist state in its strategy of absorbing incipient conflict and
eradicating dissent in such a way as to preserve the status quo." See Richard
F. Devlin, "Laws's Centaurs: An Inquiry Into the Nature and Relations of
Law, State, and Violence," Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 27, 2 (Summer
1989),247.
69 Crown Counsel's (Andrews) Address to the Jury (hereafter Crown Counsel),
23 Dec. 1919,9. PAM MG 10 A 14-254.
70 Winnipeg Evening Telegram, 20 Nov. 1919.
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In fact, Andrews acknowledged, they had not.71 It would be neces-
sary only "for the Crown to prove a combination, agreement or
conspiracy, to bring about, to carry into execution ... a seditious
intention. A plot against the State. ,,72
But, what constituted a seditious intention? Andrews proposed
to employ the definition suggested by British jurist, Mr. Justice
Steven, that
a seditious intention is an intention to bring into hatred and
contempt or to excite dissatisfaction against the person of His
Majesty, or the government and constitution ofthe United King-
dom as by law established, or either the houses of parliament, or
the administration of justice; ... [or], to excite His Majesty's
subjects to attempt otherwise than by lawful means or to raise
discontent and disaffection amongst His Majesty's subjects in
order to promote feelings ofill will and hostility between different
classes ofsuch subjects.73
The definition proposed by Andrews, with some minor alterations,
had been contained in the proposed 1892 Criminal Code but had
been deleted during debates on the proposed Code because of
opposition in Parliament.74 William Mulock had opposed inclusion
of the definition. He argued prophetically that such a definition
would intrude into controversies better left out of the courts. In
particular, he had in mind "controversies between labour and
capital. ,,75 Mulock believed that inclusion of the proposed defini-
tion would be followed by further amendments which, eventually,
would end freedom of speech. He warned Justice Minister John
Thompson that
71 Crown Counsel, 23 Dec. 1919,5.
72 Ibid.
73 Debates ofthe House ofCommons, Vol. IV, 1919,3289.
74 Desmond H. Brown, "Parliamentary Magic: Sir John Thompson and the
Enactment ofthe Criminal Code," Journal ofCanadian Studies, 27,4 (1993),
30-1.
75 Debates ofthe House ofCommons, XXXV, 1892, col. 2837.
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in a little time you will be clothing your officers with power to
prevent public meetings ... The whole history ofthe institutions of
the mother land warrants us in concluding that the greatest safety
lies in freedom of discussion. A British mob allows its ill will to
pass offby using strong language, while in other countries, where
freedom of discussion is prohibited, this ill-will takes the form of
deeds ofviolence and causes the formation ofsecret societies.76
Mulock concluded by asserting that he would "oppose anything
which will prevent a man from expressing his views in regard to
any matter against the state or in the state. ,,77 Deletion of the
definition from the revised Criminal Code of 1892 left discretion
with the bench to exercise a quasi-legislative authority to define
sedition, while prosecuting counsel such as Andrews gained con-
siderable latitude in making their case to a jury.78
In the final analysis, then, how the state chose to define sedition
was a political matter of the first order for it bore directly on the
juridical nature of Canadian citizenship and the relationship be-
tween the governed and the government. Given the nature of the
indictment and the undefined legal character of seditious intent,
Andrews' role in the courtroom was a profoundly political one. In
fact, Andrews had justified the prosecution to Meighen and Do-
herty as an essential act of state repression in the struggle against
labour radicalism. It followed that the trial was not a typical
criminal prosecution, but an ideological struggle designed to de-
fend the status quo ante, to outlaw the One Big Union, to suppress
criticism ofthe state, and to punish advocates ofradical social and
economic change. For Andrews, the sedition trials provided an
opportunity to advance a construction of seditious conspiracy that
resonated with what he almost certainly knew were the preconcep-
76 Ibid., col. 2837.
77 Ibid., col. 2837.
78 Desmond H. Brown, "Parliamentary Magic: Sir John Thompson and the
Enactment of the Criminal Code,"38. For a discussion ofthe law ofsedition
as it applied to the Russell case see Desmond H. Brown, "The Craftsmanship
ofBias: Sedition and the Winnipeg General Strike," Manitoba Law Journal,
14 (1984),1-33.
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tions held by the jury that the strike was the project of disloyal,
unpatriotic, undemocratic "Reds" consumed with a determination
to impose a Soviet style dictatorship on Canada.
R.B. Russell's trial extended from late November 1919 until the
end of December. Throughout, Andrews contended that evidence
of Russell's seditious intent was ubiquitous. For example, while
none ofthe resolutions adopted during the Walker Theatre meeting
in December 1918 were seditious, Andrews contended that, if the
jury' 'pierced the thin veil ofdeception" it would see a meeting full
of seditious intent. Moreover, those at the meeting had "endeav-
oured to establish the fact that there was a class struggle. ,,79 It was
clear to Andrews that the timing of the Walker Theatre meeting
demonstrated seditious intent. The organizers of the event had
chosen the most effective time to promote discontent and disaffec-
tion. Andrews explained to the jury that "some ofyou are farmers
and you know there is a law in this country which compels you as a
precautionary measure to have a certain number of men present
when you light a fire on the prairie. ,,80
Russell's association with the Socialist Party of Canada (SPC)
provided further evidence of his guilt.8I Andrews alleged that the
Party advocated the abolition of national sentiment and promoted
allegiance only to class. Such a doctrine was the moral equivalent
of that embraced by deserters and opponents of conscription.
Andrews also charged that the SPC was undemocratic. It taught that
the political actions of the working class were not constrained by
the bounds ofparliamentary rule. Any political action was justified
if it was "action taken by the slave class against the master class to
obtain control ofthe powers ofthe state. ,,82 In Andrews' view, such
79 Winnipeg Evening Telegram, 28 Nov. 1919.
80 Ibid, 33.
81 For an astute analysis of the program and intentions of the Socialist Party of
Canada in 1919 see Gerald Friesen, "'Yours in Revolt': The Socialist Party
of Canada and the Western Canadian Labour Movement," LabourlLe
Travail/er, 1 (1976).
82 Crown Counsel, 38.
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claims warranted prosecution for seditious conspiracy. As An-
drews explained, it was
not a crime for Mr. Russell to get up and say that he thinks the
Russian government is a fine government, but he must not carry it
to the limit of getting people to hate our form of government, he
must not excite revolt; he must not excite discontent.83
To underscore the misguided nature ofRussell's alleged views,
Andrews asserted that there was no master class or slave class in
this country. Conditions existed which provided a "free opportu-
nity for every man to rise." Andrews prayed that the time would
never come when under the dictatorship of the proletariat all were
reduced to one leve1.84 Just as there was no master class or slave
class in the country, the notion that the state was a tool of a
"bourgeois" ruling class was a simple fabrication and seditious
because it was designed to cause disaffection between the people
and their government.
In addition to promoting disaffection within the state, the asser-
tions ofclass rule denigrated the enormous sacrifice made by those
who went to war for Canada. Andrews invited the jury to consider
this from a very personal point ofview:
Some ofyour boys went to war. Did they know they were offering
their lives to extend the profits ofcapitalists. Don't you think that
they went into this war for a principle. And haven't you given your
money, and have not some ofour friends given their lives for this
principle.85
Yet, what had Russell and his associates done? They had provoked







Efforts by the defence to mount an ideological response to the
prosecution's withering month long denunciation of Russell in
which the Crown submitted over 1,700 documents as evidence
against the accused were frustrated by the Bench.87 Latitude that
Justice Metcalfe openly granted to the prosecution was denied the
defence. Metcalfe refused to allow the admission of evidence
concerning the role of the Committee of 1000 in the Strike. For
example he refused defence counsel permission to enter as evi-
dence a copy ofthe Winnipeg Citizen. Defence wished to show that
the Committee had published falsehoods and had prejudiced the
cause ofIabour.88 Through such nefarious activities, contended the
defence, the leaders of the Citizens' Committee had engaged in a
conspiracy to crush the labour movement. Metcalfe told the court
that the Committee had nothing to do with the trial and ruled that
the paper not be introduced as evidence.
Lead defence counsel Robert Cassidy, K.C., also contended that
government policy in regard to the strike had been directed by the
Committee composed of "the bankers, all the loan company man-
agers, all the money class of Winnipeg. ,,89 Moreover, Russell's
trial was " not an ordinary court procedure but one conducted by a
vigilance committee. ,,90 Cassidy denied the existence ofa conspir-
acy and asserted that the strike was a conflict over the principle of
collective bargaining.
Defence counsel also responded to the prosecution's case with a
defence rooted in legal process and procedure. For example, Cas-
sidy opposed the admissibility ofmuch ofthe Crown's evidence as
not applicable to the charges against Russell. He argued that
evidence related to the activities and program ofthe Socialist Party
87 Canadian Annual Review, 1919,480.
88 Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 12 Dec. 1919.
89 Winnipeg Evening Telegram, 17 Dec. 1919. Robert Cassidy K.C. emigrated
to Canada from his native Ireland as a young man and practiced law for many
years in Victoria and Vancouver. In his distinguished career he appeared in
every Court in B.C., the Supreme Court ofCanada and the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council. See his obituary in The Advocate, 5 (1947), 99.
90 Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 22 Dec. 1919
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of Canada and the One Big Union was not legal evidence of
seditious intent. As he told the court, "ifwe are to be held respon-
sible for the statements ofevery organization, or ofevery individual
who was ever a member ofthe Socialist party, we might just as well
send the accused to jail right away.,,91 In every case Judge Metcalfe
admitted the Crown's evidence conditional upon Andrews demon-
strating the complicity ofRussell.
The defence was more successful in advancing its contention
that the introduction against Russell of Orders in Council which
prohibited literature found in his possession was improper. They
argued that the War Measures Act and the Orders in Council arising
from it were in force only during the war.92 Defence counsel also
noted that the Mathers Commission had recommended the rescind-
ing of Orders in Council affecting freedom of the press and the
freedom ofspeech. Metcalfe denied the admission into evidence of
the recommendations of the Mathers Commission, yet he did
acknowledge with regard to Orders in Council that the defence had
raised a very substantive point that he was reluctant to rule on
without consultation.93
At the conclusion ofthe trial, Judge Metcalfe' s charge to the jury
lasted three hours and twenty minutes. A number of legal scholars
have agreed with W.H. Trueman's assessment that Metcalfe's
charge was based on "a complete conviction ofRussell's guilt.,,94
Assessing Metcalfe's performance, Desmond Brown concluded
that
it was perhaps his skilful manipulation of cases, to arrive at a
pernicious definition of conspiracy, that was repugnant to the
provisions ofthe Criminal Code, which best displayed his juristic
91 Winnipeg Evening Telegra/n, 6 Dec. 1919.
92 Ibid., 12 Dec. 1919.
93 F. Murray Greenwood argues that the Borden government had given
assurances in 1914 that the use of the authorities provided in War Measures
Act would be used only during the war. See F. Murray Greenwood, "The
Drafting and passage of the War Measures Act in 1914 and 1927: Object
Lessons in the Need for Vigilance," 291-307.
94 Desmond H. Brown, 3.
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talents. It is a fact that the jury could have found Russell not guilty,
but Mr. Justice Metcalfe was ajudicial craftsman ofthe first order,
and the jury took his direction and pronounced the verdict he so
obviously desired.95
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Russell was convicted on all counts and sentenced to two years in
prison. Efforts to appeal the conviction on the legality of the
indictment, the selection ofthe jury, the trial judge's rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, and the content of his submission to the
jury were unsuccessful.96
Andrews had begun preparations for the trial of the remaining
seven strike leaders immediately after the Russell trial. He told
Doherty that there were 250 names on the jury list and that he was
taking steps to obtain the list and to make arrangements to secure
information about potential jurors.97 The McDonald Detective
Agency was retained for this purpose.98 When the trial began at the
end ofJanuary, Andrews faced ajury composed entirely offarmers
from rural Manitoba.99 In order to get the 12 jurors, Andrews had
stood aside 31 others.
95 Ibid., 32-3.
96 Report to the Commissioner, RNWMP, 19 Jan. 1920, NAC, Access,
"Winnipeg" RCMP. Because the Manitoba Appeal court was unanimous in
its ruling Russell could not appeal his conviction to the Supreme Court of
Canada. He was however able to appeal to the Judicial Committee ofthe Privy
Council. The JCPC refused to hear his appeal. See Esau et al. For an
assessment of the findings of the Appeal Court see Leslie Katz, 44.
97 Andrews to Doherty 25 Dec. 1919, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" Justice,
(Pocket 1).
98 Winnipeg Free Press, 29 Jan. 1920. In the course of selecting the jury 110
jurymen were called and considered. Of these 17 were peremptorily
challenged by the defence; 41 stood aside on grounds admitted by both the
defence and crown; 7 were tried and found unfit; 1 ruled unfit by the judge.
On the Macdonald Detective Agency see bill for service, 5 Jan. 1920), NAC,
Access, "Winnipeg" Justice, Pocket 2.
99 The jury was composed ofD. Bruce, Carman; G.C. Glenny, St. Marks; A.H.
Quick, Emerson; George Morrison, J.M. Henderson, Hazelridge; James Jack,
James Kirkpatrick, Ridgeville; John Stephens, Hazelridge; A. Davidson,
Sperling; Herman Johnson, Lundar; Thos. Spence, Greenridge; and Alex
Sinc1air, Tyndall. Winnipeg Free Press, 25 Jan. 1920.
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On 20 January 1920 the case against William Ivens, R.E. Bray,
W.A. Pritchard, John Queen, A.A. Heaps, George Armstrong, and
R.J. Johns began with Justice Metcalfe presiding. The evidence
presented by the Crown against the accused was similar to that
advanced in the Russell case. A. J. Andrews sought to implicate the
accused in a seditious conspiracy through their participation in the
principal events of the period beginning with the Walker Theatre
meeting in December 1918 and through their association with the
One Big Union, The Socialist Party of Canada and the Winnipeg
General Strike. He told the jury that R.B. Russell had been con-
victed on essentially the same evidence presented by the Crown
against Ivens and the others.
The defendants understood their prosecution to be a political
struggle. From the outset they challenged the legitimacy of the
proceedings. The defence alleged that the Sheriffor his officers had
improperly allowed Counsel for the Crown to examine the jury list
before it had been returned to the Court; that the Crown had
interfered with the jury; that Counsel for the Crown was not fit to
prosecute because oftheir personal involvement in the strike; that
Justice Metcalfe was biased and therefore unfit to preside; that the
Indictment was inadequate; and, that the accused could not get a
fair trial owing to the publicity given the case of R.B. Russell.
Metcalfe dismissed all defence motions other than that dealing with
the challenge to the array of jurors. In the proceedings that fol-
lowed, Deputy SheriffPyniger told the court that an order had been
presented signed by Justice Gait of the Court of Appeal ordering
him to give the Counsel for the Crown a copy of the Jury list. He
had done so and, at the same time, had supplied a copy to the
counsel for the Defence. Masters reports that defence counsel
McMurray "denied that he had heard of Mr. Justice Gait's or-
der. ,,100 In the end a verdict was returned completely exonerating
the Sheriffofany misconduct with regard to the jury list.
100 D.e. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, 121.
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The defendants countered the Crown's political prosecution
with an unconventional defence. They called no witnesses, sought
to discredit Crown witnesses as paid informants, and responded to
the prosecution with lengthy refutations of the Crown's case. The
insistence ofQueen, Ivens, Pritchard, and Heaps that they speak for
themselves reflected an understanding among the defendants that
they, not counsel, were better able to advance the kind of radical
discourse required to counter the ideological assault from the
Crown. Each sought to situate the labour revolt of 1919 on the
terrain of legitimate political and social struggle. In long addresses
the defendants with their lawyers, W.H. Trueman and E.J. McMur-
ray, contested the legitimacy of the proceedings, defended the
General Strike and the One Big Union, and advocated the cause of
labour radicalism.
John Queen told the court that the Citizen's Committee, not the
Strike Committee, had usurped the authority of the City Council
during the strike. 101 Queen believed that his prosecution was politi-
cally inspired. A.J. Andrews had a personal interest in his convic-
tion for it would mean his removal from City Council. Queen
believed that the Crown was attempting to introduce a reign of
terror in Canada. The nocturnal raids of the homes of workers
across the country to secure materials that could be "bought at
bookstores" was designed to "give the impression to the people of
Canada that it was a terrible crime to have this literature and they
must use stem measures to get the evidence."lo2 He sought the
jury's protection from the "unholy hands" of A.J. Andrews who
had instigated what Queen viewed as judicial persecution.
William Ivens framed his address in the idiom of the Social
Gospel with himself as a "liberator." He invited the jury to con-
sider the fact that "emancipators always have been thrown in jail."
The real criminals were the "profiteer who became rich out of
blood and tears and who wraps himself in the flag and becomes a
101 Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 18 Mar. 1920.
102 Ibid., 19 Mar. 1920
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patrioteer." He charged that his arrest and the arrests of the other
defendents had been designed simply to break the strike and "there
had to be a case patched up afterward.' ,103
In his address to the jury, W.H. Trueman sought to situate the
labour revolt of 1919 squarely within the tradition of legitimate
British radicalism and to portray it as a campaign for substantive
rights of citizenship. To legitimize Canadian radicalism, Trueman
invoked the prestige ofthe British Labour Party. He quoted exten-
sively from an article by Arthur Henderson, Secretary ofthe Labour
Party, on the post-war industrial unrest. Henderson had traced the
roots of unrest, not to the War, but to "an insurgent spirit" which
was "in essence a moral struggle to attain to the complete develop-
ment and fullness ofhuman life." The workers had fought oppres-
sion abroad and were determined to reject an equally unacceptable
economic and industrial oppression at home. 104 Trueman con-
tended that Henderson's analysis of the British scene applied
equally well to Canada.
E.J. McMurray told the jury that the trial deserved "to rank with
the trials 150 years ago in England when men stood up in court and
fought a despotic government." He attacked the assault on the
strike leadership through the amendments to the Immigration Act,
the Criminal Code, and the judicial process, and contended that the
trial amounted to, a "fight for freedom of speech, freedom of the
press and the right of labour to organize.,,105 In McMurray's view
the trial was simply a concerted effort to "get" leaders of the
workers who had been making a determined fight for labour's
rights. 106
Prichard's address was regarded by observers as a masterpiece.
In it he condemned the continued imposition of the War Measures
Act as abhorrent for "the power given the governor-in-council by
103 Ibid.
104 The Right Hon. Arthur Henderson,"The Industrial Unrest: A New Policy
Required," 361-369, The Contemporary Review, CXV (Jan. - Jun. 1919).
105 Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 20 Mar. 1920.
106 Ibid., 22 Mar. 1920
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this act made him practically an autocrat. " He contended that every
British subject had the right to hold or express any theory of
government provided he did so without violence or malicious
purpose. ID? Pritchard believed that history would vindicate his
position. As he told the jury: "this is not so much a matter of
Pritchard's liberty as a matter of history. History, I am sure will
vindicate us."
Pritchard also defended the One Big Union. It was the only way
for the skilled worker to protect himself from low wages and
unemployment. The formation ofthe trust in modem business had
made the same sort of organization necessary among workers.
Moreover, the machines of modem industry had broken down the
workers' craft divisions and the workers themselves had to break
down their own craft lines and organize together to meet the new
conditions they faced. Pritchard condemned the prosecution as
"the most damnable piece ofinfamy that ever has been perpetuated
in any court ofjustice in the British Empire. ,,108 He told the jury that
"you can't kill theories with a club and you can't blow theories into
oblivion with machine guns."
The political turn of the addresses by Prichard and the others
concerned Andrews and the RNWMP. Pritchard's address, noted a
RNWMP report, caused excited comment throughout Winnipeg. It
was" a masterful defiance of law, Court, Judge and Jury, and quite
at variance with the utterances ofthe others." The Police feared that
Prichard's acquittal would have a dramatic effect on the minds of
the workers. It would signal that he was "above the law." Agent 65
suggested to his superiors that "it would be a good idea to prohibit
Sunday meetings in theatres or Public Halls for a time or meetings
ofany kind?"lo9
On 27 March 1920 Ivens, Pritchard, Johns, Queen, and Arm-
strong were found guilty on all counts. R.E. Bray was found guilty
ofbeing a Common Nuisance and A.A. Heaps was acquitted of all
107 Ibid., 24 Mar. 1920.
108 Ibid., 23 Mar. 1920
109 Report from Agent 63, 24 Mar. 1920, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" RCMP.
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charges. As well, a strong recommendation ofmercy accompanied
. the verdict in each case. On the morning of 6 April 1920 Ivens,
Johns, Pritchard, Queen and Armstrong were sentenced to one year
each on the first six counts of seditious conspiracy and six months
each on the seventh. The sentences were to run concurrently. R.E.
Bray was sentenced to six months at hard labour on the charge of
common nuisance. In passing sentence, Metcalfe noted that he was
taking into consideration the recommendation for mercy made by
the jury.110
A.J. Andrews believed that the prosecutions had been required
to justify the suppression ofthe Winnipeg General strike, to mobi-
lize consent for the established order, and to limit legal criticism of
the state. While convictions were secured, Andrews could claim
only limited success for his strategy ofemploying the courts and the
criminal law to buttress the social order. III In the face ofa vigorous
prosecution and before an unsympathetic judge, Russell and his
co-defendants contested their prosecution through substantive
refutations of the Crown's case and procedural strategies inherent
in the law. Across the country workers dismissed the prosecution
as simply state repression disguised. In April, following the trials,
Andrews acknowledged to C.J. Doherty that it was "questionable
if we could secure the conviction of these people by other ju-
ries. ,,112
The Winnipeg General Strike reflected a broadly based rejection
of pre-war relations of power and authority. Not surprisingly, the
tide of post-war radicalism did not subside with the state suppres-
110 RCMP Report, 7 Apr. 1920, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg" RCMP.
III Barry Wright has shown how "The imposition of emergency executive
enabling legislation on a pennanent basis (the War Measures Act), the
widened definitions of unlawful assembly and seditious activity, as well as
aliens and the summary deportation ofaliens (amendments passed during the
Winnipeg General Strike followed by sections 41 and 42 of the Immigration
Act and section 98 of the Criminal Code) all had precedents in the Upper
Canadian measures. Barry Wright, "Sedition in Upper Canada: Contested
Legality," Labour/Le Travail, 29 (Spring 1992), 7-57.
112 AJ. Andrews to CJ. Doherty, 29 Mar. 1920, NAC, Access, "Winnipeg"
Justice, (Pocket 1).
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sion of the strike. During the summer of 1919, Andrews and the
Citizens' Committee remained convinced that the intervention of
the state against the strike had not removed the threat of social
disorder. Determined to ensure continuing state action to subdue
agents ofdisorder, Andrews and the Committee of1000 constituted
themselves as a kind of vanguard of reaction against continuing
currents of opposition to the status quo. Led by A.l. Andrews,
members of the Committee mobilized the authority and resources
of the federal Department of Justice in legal and ideological as-
saults on labour radicalism designed· to discredit and disperse
proponents ofradicalism in Winnipeg and elsewhere and to restore
the legitimacy of the existing order. Claims for a substantive
citizenship rooted in the ideological legacy of the Great War were
dismissed. Post-war radicalism was condemned as a species of
Bolshevism and the workers' revolt of 1919 was condemned as a
criminal enterprise. Yet, the legal and ideological ascendency of
the Citizens and their allies in the state was far from absolute.
Rather than produce mass adhesion to the established order, the
assault on radicalism generated working-class dissent and antago-
nism. Contrary to the general portrayal ofthe strike's aftermath as
a period of abject defeat for labour, the response ofworkers to the
offensive against radicalism engineered by the Citizens was one of
struggle and resistance. In doing so, workers, in Winnipeg and
elsewhere, came to a better understanding of the strategies, re-
sources, and will required in the complex and ineluctable struggle
in which they were involved.
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